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1. Introduction
South African courts have to deal with the sentencing of convicted accused on a daily 
basis. While presiding officers are well-trained and experienced in sentencing matters, it 
seems that compensation orders are not generally invoked as a form of punishment. This 
article discusses compensation orders as a possible form of punishment that could be 
used in our courts. It could be one of the factors that may help to reduce an accused’s 
prison sentence and also to compensate victims who have suffered damage or loss 
resulting from criminal activities.1 
An accused’s constitutional right to a fair trial provides that the lightest possible 
punishment should be imposed upon him.2 If a compensation order is indeed a more 
lenient sentence, it should then be imposed. The actual sentence rests solely in the 
discretion of the presiding officer. There are various sentencing options available to a 
presiding officer, of which life imprisonment is the heaviest, and a fine the most lenient. A 
fine is a form of punishment which requires the accused to pay an amount of money to the 
state. A compensation order, on the other hand, is a sentencing option that requires the 
accused to pay a monetary amount, as determined by the court, to the victim. Notably, the 
court will not grant such an order if the accused does not have the financial means to pay 
the compensation. Compensation orders may take various forms and are not limited to 
monetary amounts. Compensation orders are regulated in terms of sections 297 and 300 
of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (CPA).3  
In sentencing, especially for the commission of violent crimes, severe sentences can be 
imposed and in those instances no consideration should be given to impose a fine. Yet it is 
not too outrageous to grant compensation orders, especially if all the parties involved 
have consented thereto.  
Compensation orders form part of restorative justice sentences and are regarded as part 
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1 In this contribution the word victims includes complainants as well as their family members. 
2 See s 35(3)(n) of the Constitution of South Africa, 1996. 
3 Act 51 of 1997.  
2 
of the reform theory. McCold and Wachtel 4  define restorative justice as a "process 
involving the right stakeholders determining how best to repair the harm done by 
offending behavior". Restorative justice as a legal concept has grown in stature, especially 
after the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in South 
Africa.5 Due to the sensitive nature of the transition from apartheid to democracy, the 
TRC, which is renowned worldwide, is proof that restorative justice does deserve its place 
in the South African legal system. However, there are those who criticize the principle of 
restorative justice, particularly the interaction between the theories of restorative justice 
and retribution.6 The imbalance is especially clear in serious cases where courts are 
reluctant to impose a sentence such as a compensation fine.7 
This contribution first discusses compensation orders and thereafter focusses on the 
legislation providing for the issuance of such orders. This is followed by a discussion of 
how these sentences can be applied within the context of restorative justice. Then the 
focus shifts to several court decisions where the problems and challenges regarding 
compensation orders are highlighted. The cases where compensation orders were 
imposed are analysed to determine whether it is problematic or not. Finally, suggestions 
regarding compensation orders are made and the way forward for South Africa is 
discussed. 
2. Compensation orders
In criminal cases the courts must consider a number of factors in sentencing an accused, 
while they have a number of sentencing options to choose from.8 The most common 
sentences are either a fine or direct imprisonment. A fine as a sentence is generally 
imposed in South African courts. Imprisonment may of course be accompanied by a fine, 
or a fine may be imposed as a condition of a suspended sentence.9 
A sentence of a fine involves that the offender must pay a sum of money to the state as 
punishment for his crime or crimes.10 In such a case, the complainant or injured person is 
usually not entitled to such payments. Although courts in general have a wide discretion 
to impose fines, there are several guidelines that must be followed.11 First, the crimes 
must not be so severe that imprisonment should be imposed.12 The offender must also 
have the financial ability or have access to finance with which the fine can be paid.13 
Usually fines are imposed for crimes committed for financial gain, if the court decides in 
that instance to impose a fine. It is not advisable to impose a fine as a penalty if the 
amount is beyond the capacity of such person.14 Fines should also not be so small that 
4 McCold & Wachtel (2002:111). 
5 The Truth and Reconciliation Commission is incorporated in terms of s 2 of the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation 
Act 34 of 1995. 
6 See Boutellier (2006:26). 
7 See DPP v Thabethe [2011] ZASCA 186; Seedat v S (731/2015) [2016] ZASCA 153. 
8 See Joubert (2013:326). 
9 See s 297(1) of the CPA; Steytler (1996:426). 
10 Joubert (2013:342). 
11 Joubert (2013:343). 
12 Ibid. 
13 S v Frans 1924 TPD 419. See also Joubert (2013:343). 
14 S v Ncobo 1988 3 SA 954 (N). See also Joubert (2013:343). 
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they do not reflect the seriousness of the offence.15 
 
However, in the case of compensation orders, a sum of money paid by the offender, goes 
to the disadvantaged and not to the state. The offender pays the amount either directly to 
the disadvantaged or the clerk of the court for the damage or loss suffered because of the 
actions of the accused. 
 
The court will, inter alia, consider the following circumstances when imposing 
compensation orders: where physical damage is inflicted upon the person or property of 
the victim, as well as for emotional damage, pain and suffering.16 
 
2.1 Compensation orders in the Criminal Procedure Act 
2.1.1 Section 300 
Compensation orders for damage to the property of a person is governed by section 300 
of the Criminal Procedure Act. In terms of this section a compensation order can be 
granted where there is damage to or loss of any property of the victim. It provides that any 
convicted offender, who has caused damage to or loss of property of another, can be 
ordered in certain circumstances to pay. This has the effect of a civil judgment. The 
Supreme Court has unlimited jurisdiction to grant such orders, but the jurisdiction of the 
regional and magistrates’ courts is limited to R600 000 and R120 000, respectively.17 
 
However, there are other requirements that must be met before a section 300 payment 
order may be issued. The court may impose such an order only if the injured party has 
applied for it,18 or where the prosecutor brought the application on the instruction of the 
injured person.19 These orders are limited to compensation for direct loss or damage.20 
Section 300 compensation orders are not recommended for any damages arising out of 
car accidents, because the determination of such damages is a lengthy process.21 It is also 
an issue that is usually placed in dispute during civil proceedings. 
 
Because section 300 has the effect of a civil judgment, an alternative sentence of 
imprisonment for non-payment thereof may not be made to enforce payment.22 It is 
recommended that in the event of default payments, the aggrieved party should utilise 
execution proceedings in the civil courts as a possible solution. 
This kind of sentence can therefore not be imposed if there was no damage to or loss of 
property. However, several reported decisions indicate that some courts  erred by issuing 
compensation orders which were  in no way  authorised in terms of the relevant 
legislation.23 It is also possible that the intention of the courts was to issue compensation 
orders, but incorrectly authorised the orders under section 300.24 
 
                                                 
15 S v Bhembe 1993 1 SASV 164 (T). 
16 See s 297 of the CPA. See also Jordi (2005). 
17 S 92(1)(b) of the Magistrates’ Court Act 32 of 1944. 
18 S v Dhlamini 1967 4 SA 679 (N). 
19 S v Vanmali 1975 1 SA 17 (N). 
20 S v Mokwana 1969 2 SA 484 (0); S v Du Plessis 1969 1 SA 72 (N). 
21 Joubert (2013:356). 
22 S v Msiza 1979 4 SA 473 (T). 
23 See S v Huhu [2013] ZAFSHC 74; S v Khoza 2011 1 SACR 482 (GSJ). 
24 S v Huhu paras. 3, 5. 
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2.1.2 Section 297 
According to section 297 of the CPA, a court may postpone a sentence for a period of five 
years, with a suspended condition which includes the payment of a sum of money to the 
victim or his family.25 
 
Section 297(1) provides as follows: 
 
  (1) Where a court convicts a person of any offence, other than an     
offence in respect of which a law prescribes a minimum punishment, the court may in its 
discretion: 
(a) postpone the passing of the sentence for a period not exceeding five years and release 
the person concerned - 
(i) on one or more conditions, whether as to- 
(aa) compensation; 
  
In terms of this section the court may postpone sentencing for a maximum of five years 
and either release the offender unconditionally or on one or more conditions, including 
the payment of a sum of money to the victim.26 Section 297(1) excludes offences where a 
minimum penalty is prescribed by law; but section 297(4) does not exclude offences 
where minimum sentences are prescribed. 
 
This specific condition differs from the conventional negative conditions usually 
associated with suspended sentences. The condition is usually negative in nature, namely 
that a person should not commit similar crimes during the period of suspension.27 
 
Compensation orders can be described as a positive condition. Other positive conditions 
include community service, correctional supervision, and the requirement to undergo 
treatment or to attend lectures or complete certain courses. These types of condition aim 
to rehabilitate the accused and to allow him to make a positive contribution to society. 
 
The accused may also be requested to appear again before the court in the future if he is 
called upon to do so before the expiry of the period. If the person is not summoned to 
appear before the court, or if the court finds that the conditions were met, no further 
sentence will be imposed and the sentence comes down to a warning by the court.28 
   
3. A restorative justice option 
Compensation orders is a form of restorative justice which forms an important part of the 
South African legal system. Overcrowded prisons, coupled with various other factors, 
have forced the government to consider alternative sentences such as restorative justice.29 
Restorative justice is a relatively new concept in South Africa that has not taken off yet - it 
is only in its third decade.30 Restorative justice regularly finds itself in conflict with the 
principles of general criminal law which are based on retaliation.  
                                                 
25 See also Joubert (2013:355). 
26 See S v Charlie 1976 2 SA 596 (A); S v Edward 1978 1 SA 317  (NC). See also Joubert (2013:355). 
27 S v Tshali 1985 3 SA 373 (E). 
28 Joubert (2013:352). 
29 See Snyman (2014:18). 
30 Compare Koen (2007:247). 
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Due to the high crime rate in South Africa, there is an expectation that the courts will 
punish offenders and remove them from society.31 Restorative justice, to a certain extent, 
opposes the orthodox criminal principles of retribution. A thief for example, is normally 
seen through the lens of retaliation, whereas restorative justice considers the person as 
someone who can be rehabilitated. It is, however, not the purpose of restorative justice to 
replace the principles of criminal law.32 
 
Boutellier33 notes: "Restorative justice is not so much an alternative as another strategy in 
security politics. It is not a substitution for criminal justice, but a contribution to the 
ongoing reshaping of social order”. 
 
It can play a significant role in balancing the various sentencing options, while it also 
provides a way out for some offenders who have lost all hope. Accordingly, the community 
may also become involved in the process to ensure that an inclusive and just model is 
created. 
 
The unique realisation of restorative justice is that the accused must accept responsibility 
for his actions.34 It is also important for the accused to accept that the victim is an 
individual and should be respected.35 In addition, restorative justice has multiple benefits 
for victims.36 The disadvantaged person is a central figure in the process of restorative 
justice. 
 
Koen37  argues: "In the restorative paradigm, victim empowerment is more than just 
giving the crime victim a role in the criminal justice system. It is really about 
reconstructing that system in such a way that it cannot function without the co-operation 
of the crime victim”. 
 
Due to the devastating effects of crime, disadvantaged victims are usually in a worse 
position than before. Despite this, some criminals are of the opinion that their offences 
did not affect anyone, like a person who evades taxes.38 This is obviously not true, because 
there is always a victim who is affected by a crime in one way or another. Unlike orthodox 
criminal law, restorative justice focusses on giving the disadvantaged victim a voice of his 
own. These days it is almost impossible to think of a legal system without the influence of 
restorative justice. Frehsee39 argues that "[c]riminal procedure ... is ill-equipped to deal 
with the emotional trauma the victim suffers as a result of the crime”. 
 
Restorative justice fills this gap.40  The payment of reparations is a popular form of 
                                                 
31 Boutellier (2006:27) states: “The protection of citizens has become the dominant crime policy theme”. 
32 See Boutellier (2006:26). 
33 Ibid. 
34 See Hudson (2003:180); Koen (2007:256). 
35 Hudson (2003:180). 
36 See Achilles & Stutzman-Amstutz (2008:211); Koen (2007:254); Makiwane (2015:84); Neser (2001:85). Abel & Marsh 
remarked that “Restitutionary systems provide victim-focused law and therefore address the issue of securing liberty for those 
whose ability to pursue their social options has been damaged by a criminal act”. See also Abel & Marsh (1984:160). 
37 Koen (2007:255). 
38 Hudson (2003:180). 
39 Frehsee (1999–2000:236). 
40 Villa-Vicencio (2008:387) explaines “Restorative justice seeks to recover dimensions of justice often lost within the institutional 
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restorative justice. This mainly occurred after the Second World War when East Germany 
and West Germany were ordered to pay financial reparations to the Allied forces.41 The 
word “reparations” originates from the word “repair”.42 The "repair" taking place with the 
payment of a monetary amount to a victim plays an important role in the recovery of the 
victim's pain. Although the pain is partially eased, it is still an important step in the 
reconciliation between the victim and the accused.43 
 
Such compensation fulfils an important role in effectively reforming the criminal. 
Restorative justice is classified among the different theories of punishment as a reform 
theory.44 The aim of the theory is to reform and rehabilitate the offender.45 This theory is 
diametrically opposed to many other theories of punishment, such as retribution or 
prevention, which focus more on punishing the offender. Whilst the reform theory also 
contains an element of punishment, it is the rehabilitation of the offender that is the 
decisive aspect.46 The pain and suffering of victims are also taken into account. 
 
Nevertheless, the reform theory is certainly open to criticism. The following aspects are 
noteworthy.  
 
First, the principles of the theory are not always in proportion to the degree and 
seriousness of the offence.47 The imposition of a compensation fine instead of a prison 
sentence in the context of a serious crime will always be questioned. Perhaps one should 
not only compare the reform issue with the type of offence, but also take into account the 
victim of the crime. In addition, there is less weight placed on the seriousness of the crime 
and more attention is given to reform. 
 
Secondly, it is difficult to determine exactly when an offender is finally reformed.48 It may 
take a few months or even several years. Either way, it is important that the offender is 
afforded an opportunity to rehabilitate. 
 
Thirdly, the theory is not always convincing in the case of older offenders.49 Unlike 
younger offenders, it is difficult to change established habits in older offenders.50 
 
Fourthly, statistics indicate that a criminal cannot always be reformed.51 The reality is that 
some criminals are incorrigible.52 
 
Notwithstanding the fact that the reform theory is under frequent criticism, it is crucial 
for the effective functioning of the judicial system. As mentioned above, extremely high 
                                                                                                                                                                
retributive justice process”. 
41 See Danieli (2008:343–54). See also Cunneen (2008:355–68). 
42 See English Oxford Living Dictionaries (2016). 
43 See Logan (2013:39–41). 
44 Snyman (2014:17–8). 
45 See Snyman (2014:17). 
46 See Snyman (2014:17–8). 
47 See Snyman (2014:18). See also DPP v Thabethe, where a similar limitation regarding the restorative justice    
    sentence was highlighted. 
48 Snyman (2014:18). 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 
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levels of crime in South Africa mean that the prisons simply cannot handle the high 
volume of prisoners any longer. Restorative justice offers an ideal solution under these 
challenging circumstances. It is indeed necessary to make more use of the reform theory 
to prevent the theory from losing its allure. At the same time, it is important to place more 
emphasis on the victim's contribution to the process if one is serious about the 
implementation of restorative justice as a primary sentencing option. 
 
It is here that restorative justice in all its brilliance and glory loses most of its appeal. A 
primary sentencing option such as compensation orders is rarely considered by the courts 
in more serious cases. This raises the question whether restorative justice orders, such as 
compensation orders, could be applied in serious cases or whether it is more appropriate 
in less serious cases. A discussion of recent case law places this issue under further 
scrutiny. 
 
4. The courts' approach 
In S v Huhu53 the Bloemfontein Magistrates’ Court imposed a compensation order under 
section 300. The court convicted the accused of assault with intent to do grievous bodily 
harm and malicious damage to property. The accused was sentenced to two years 
imprisonment which was suspended for five years. One of the conditions was that the 
accused pay an amount of R1 300 in terms of section 300 to the complainant.54 The fine 
was to be paid in monthly instalments on the seventh day of each month.55 
 
On review, the High Court ruled that the trial court incorrectly applied section 300 
instead of section 297 of the CPA. The court a quo therefore had erred in its interpretation 
of section 300. The review court stated that a compensation penalty under section 300 
applies only where an accused has sufficient property or executable assets to compensate 
the victim, either fully or to a large extent. This position confirmed the rule that was 
formulated in S v Khoza.56 As stated above, section 297 provides that an accused, if he or 
she is employed, may pay the fine in monthly instalments and as a condition of a 
suspended sentence.57 The court found that Huhu was unable to fully compensate the 
complainant, because he did not have sufficient or viable assets.58 In addition, the court 
amended the judgment and declared that the accused compensate the complainant in 
terms of section 297(1)(a)(i)(aa) of the CPA to the amount of R1 300.59 
 
In S v Khoza,60 the accused was charged with theft in the Johannesburg Magistrates’ 
Court. The accused was convicted of stealing R35 000 in cash from her employer and was 
sentenced to a fine of R10 000 or 36 months imprisonment. The sentence was suspended 
for a period of five years on condition that the accused is not convicted of theft or 
                                                 
53 S v Huhu [2013] ZAFSHC 74. 
54 S v Huhu para. 2. The trial court described the compensation order as a sentence as follows: “That the accused compensate the 
complainant in terms of section 300 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 in the amount of R1 300 (One Thousand Three 
Hundred Rand). Such amount is payable in monthly instalments of R200 (two hundred) and one instalment of R100 (one hundred 
rand) at Clerk of the Court, Magistrates’ Court Bloemfontein. The first instalment is payable on or before 7 March 2013 with the 
remaining instalments on or before the 7th day of each succeeding month until such amount is paid in full”. 
55 S v Huhu para. 2. 
56 S v Khoza 2011 1 SACR 482 (GSJ). 
57 S v Huhu para. 4; see also S v Khoza paras. 9–10. 
58 S v Huhu para. 5. 
59 S v Huhu para. 7. 
60 S v Khoza para. 1. 
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attempted theft during the period of suspension. The court ruled further that she had to 
pay a compensation penalty in terms of section 300. She was ordered to pay the amount 
of R20 000 as follows: R2 000 on the day of judgment, and the balance in instalments of 
R500 at the end of each month until the balance is paid in full.61 
 
The agreement between the prosecutor and the defence was that the accused must pay 
R20 000 to the complainant despite the fact that it was R15 000 less than what the 
accused originally stole from the complainant.62 The case was then referred on special 
review to the South Gauteng High Court. On review the court confirmed that there were 
two ways in which a court can make a compensation order where a complainant has 
suffered as a result of the actions of an accused. One is an order that is part of the 
suspended conditions in a sentence under section 297. The other is a compensation order 
in terms of section 300 that has the effect of a civil judgment. The court confirmed that 
both methods are discretionary and depend on the conviction of an accused for an offence 
which has caused damage.63 
 
The court ruled further that an order in terms of section 300 would only be appropriate 
where the accused has sufficient assets or money.64 If an accused is unable to fully 
compensate the complainant, an order under this section shall not be permissible. If an 
accused is working and able to pay a sum of money in instalments, it would be more 
appropriate and practical to impose a suspended sentence on condition that the amount 
be paid in periodic instalments. 
 
The case was referred back to the magistrate who convicted the accused so that a 
thorough investigation could be launched to determine whether section 297 or section 
300 was the most appropriate sentence for the purposes of a compensation order.65 
 
In S v Thabethe66 the complainant (the daughter), her mother and the accused, who was 
also the mother's lover, resided in the same property.67 The accused was the breadwinner 
in the family and a father figure to the girl.68 The daughter at the time of the incident was 
15 years and 10 months old.69 On the day of the incident the girl left without her mother 
and the accused's consent and did not return, which left them suspicious.70 The accused 
then launched a search for the complainant and found her at the home of one of her 
boyfriends.71 The complainant apparently had sexual intercourse with her boyfriend.72 To 
hide the truth from her mother,73 the complainant pleaded with the accused to convey a 
different version of the event to her mother. The accused consented on condition that the 
15-year-old complainant must have sex with him.74 The accused and the complainant then 
                                                 
61 S v Khoza para. 4. 
62 S v Khoza para. 5. 
63 S v Khoza para. 8. 
64 See also S v Baloyi 1981 2 SA 227 (T). 
65 S v Khoza para. 13. 
66 DPP v Thabethe (619/10) [2011] ZASCA 186. See also Songca & Karels (2016:456-62) for a discusion of the case. 
67 DPP v Thabethe para. 5. 
68 DPP v Thabethe paras. 5, 12. 
69 DPP v Thabethe para. 5. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid. 
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had sexual intercourse. The next day, the accused surrendered himself to the police and 
confessed that he had raped the complainant.75 The court found the accused guilty of 
rape. However, the court imposed a very light sentence that included the payment of a 
compensation fine, namely, that he must contribute 80 percent of his income to the 
complainant and her family.76  
 
One of the main mitigating factors considered during sentencing was that the 
complainant and the mother admitted that they could not survive without the accused, 
and admitted that it was their wish that he should not go to jail. 77  Besides, the 
complainant further stated that she had forgiven the accused and that they had buried the 
hatchet.78 Accordingly, the court imposed a restorative justice sentence, instead of the 
minimum sentence of 10 years imprisonment prescribed for the crime of rape of children 
under the age of 16 years.79  
 
However, the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) set aside the sentence and the accused was 
sentenced to 10 years imprisonment. The court declared that the original sentence was 
not appropriate because of the seriousness of the crime.80 The court further stated that 
courts must guard against imposing restorative justice sentences where an accused is 
convicted of a serious crime.81 The court ruled as follows:  
 
I have no doubt about the advantages of restorative justice as a viable alternative 
sentencing option provided it is applied in appropriate cases. Without attempting to lay 
down a general rule I feel obliged to caution seriously against the use of restorative justice 
as a sentence for serious offences which evoke profound feelings of outrage and revulsion 
amongst law-abiding and right-thinking members of society. An ill-considered 
application of restorative justice to an inappropriate case is likely to debase it and make it 
lose its credibility as a viable sentencing option. Sentencing officers should be careful not 
to allow some overzealousness to lead them to impose restorative justice also in cases 
where it is patently unsuitable. It is trite that one of the key ingredients of a balanced 
sentence is that it must reflect the seriousness of the offence and the natural indignation 
and outrage of the public.82 
 
In Seedat v S,83 a similar matter was raised before the SCA. In this case, the 63-year-old 
appellant was convicted in the regional court of rape and sentenced to seven years 
imprisonment. During an appeal to the High Court against his sentence, the appellant 
argued that the trial court had erred by failing to consider an alternative sentence of 
restorative justice. The appeal was upheld and the sentence of seven years imprisonment 
was set aside and replaced with an order directing that the appellant  pay the amount of 
R100 000 to the complainant.84 The Director of Public Prosecutions, however, was not 
                                                 
75S v Thabethe 2009 2 SACR 62 (T).  
76 For a list of the other sentencing conditions, see DPP v Thabethe para. 2. 
77 DPP v Thabethe para. 6. 
78 Ibid. 
79 In terms of s 51(2) of the Criminal Law Amenmend Act 105 van 1997, read with part 3 of Schedule II. 
80 DPP v Thabethe para. 19. 
81 DPP v Thabethe para. 20. See also Songca & Karels (2016:456). 
82 DPP v Thabethe para. 20. 
83 Seedat v S (731/2015) [2016] ZASCA 153. 
84 Seedat v S [2015] 3 All SA 93 (GP). 
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satisfied with the compensation order as a sentence, and further appealed to the SCA to 
set aside the judgment. He argued that the judgment of the High Court was inappropriate 
and invalid.85  
 
The appellant, a businessman who owned two shops, visited the complainant's home on 
the specific day to deliver a bed-lamp.86 He offered to show her that the lamp was in 
working condition. The complainant agreed and invited him to the bedroom, where he 
tested the lamp. According to the complainant, the appellant then had sexual intercourse 
with her in the room. The complainant requested the court to impose a community-based 
sentence and an order for financial compensation for the rape and trauma she suffered. 
She further requested that the appellant pay her R500 000 and buy her a Toyota motor 
vehicle, but would accept an amount of R100 000.87 
 
The SCA ruled that in terms of section 297(1)(a)(i)(aa) a court does not have the power to 
postpone a sentence for a maximum period of five years when the law prescribes a 
minimum penalty for such an offence.88 However, it found that section 297(4) authorised 
a court to suspend the operation of any part thereof, subject to certain conditions, where a 
person is convicted of an offence for which a law prescribes a minimum punishment. The 
court accepted that the Supreme Court was correct to find that there were substantial and 
compelling circumstances that justified a substantial deviation from the prescribed 
minimum sentence.89 The SCA found that the fact that the appellant was an elderly man, 
a first offender, and had not been in good health, justified such a departure.  
 
The court, however, disagreed with the sentiments of the High Court that the option of a 
restorative justice sentence in this case was correct.90 According to the court, the victim's 
alleged belief that it would be more appropriate for the appellant to compensate her, is 
not the only factor that should be taken into account.91 The court emphasised that rape is 
a plague in our society and that the courts have a duty to send a clear message, not only to 
the accused but also to other potential perpetrators, to show that society will not tolerate 
it. It was further decided that criminal proceedings are supposed to instil public 
confidence in the criminal justice system, and that the public should be concerned when 
the courts are prepared to impose a suspended sentence along with a monetary 
compensation order in rape cases.92 
 
Despite the advanced age of the appellant and the state of his health, the court 
determined that the imposition of a compensation order alone, was not appropriate.93 The 
court referred to Hewitt v S,94  also decided by it. In Hewitt, the appellant, an elderly man 
of 75 years, was sentenced to serve a term of imprisonment despite the fact that his health 
had seriously deteriorated. It is crucial to highlight a certain point in the Hewitt case 
                                                 
85 Seedat v S 731/2015) [2016] ZASCA 153) para. 19. 
86 Seedat v S para. 2. 
87 Seedat v S para. 12. 
88 Seedat v S para. 33. 
89 Seedat v S paras. 34, 37. 
90 Seedat v S para. 38. The SCA referred to its previous decision in DPP v Thabethe [2011] ZASCA 186; 2011 2  
    SACR 569 (SCA). 
91 Seedat v S para. 39. 
92 Seedat v S para. 40 
93 Seedat v S para. 41. 
94 Hewitt v S [2016] ZASCA 100. 
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regarding his age. Although Hewitt was a sickly man of 75 and Seedat at 63-year-old, 
relatively younger and healthier, Hewitt was given a heavier sentence than Seedat. The 
SCA replaced the sentence imposed by the High Court in Seedat with a sentence of four 
years direct imprisonment. 
 
Compensation orders are not regularly imposed in our courts.95 The matters referred to in 
this contribution have highlighted several problems and shortcomings with regard to 
compensation orders. It seems that the principle of restorative justice is largely untapped 
in compensation orders in criminal cases because of the great emphasis that the 
principles of criminal law place on retribution, focussing more on the accused and on the 
interests of the community.96 
 
Some courts have imposed compensation orders, but erred in that the incorrect sections 
of the CPA were utilised.97 It may also be a reflection that the courts are not often faced 
with these types of sentences. 
 
In both Thabethe and Seedat it is clear that the SCA is strongly opposed to solely impose 
compensation orders in serious cases such as rape and is therefore not in favour of this 
type of restorative justice sentence. Yet it seems that the High Courts are more inclined to 
impose such orders. This is an indication that the criminal justice system can indeed 
deviate from the retribution theory in serious cases. But more importantly, it proves that 
courts have a wide range of sentencing options available to them. The criminal justice 
system cannot stagnate and must be adaptable and developed in accordance with the 
changes in the common law and the Bill of Rights.98 
 
Fattah99 makes the following critical comment:  
 
I find it rather puzzling that despite enormous social evolution and vast intellectual 
progress in the last two centuries, our criminal justice system remains frozen in the era of 
retaliation. It continues to be fixated on the notion of retribution and the need to inflict 
pain and suffering on the offender by way of making him pay for the injury and harm that 
he has done. 
 
5. A new perspective 
It is trite law that, in imposing sentences, courts should consider a number of factors.100 
These are the nature and seriousness of the offence, the personal circumstances of the 
offender and the interests of the community.101 The intention should always be to seek to 
impose a balanced sentence, which should not have the effect that any factors is under- or 
over-emphasised.102 Of course we have to look at the offender as an individual. Clemency 
should also be shown to the offender. It is true that sentences are not readily available and 
cannot be taken off a shelf in a shop at regular intervals like items in a store and just 
                                                 
95 S v Khoza para. 10. 
96 See DPP v Thabethe par. 19; Seedat v S para. 38. 
97 See S v Huhu para.3; DPP v Thabethe para. 29. 
98 See Neethling (2015:408). 
99 Fattah (2007:211). 
100 Joubert (2013:325–7). 
101 See S v Rabie 1975 4 SA 855 (A). See further Joubert (2013:326). 
102 Joubert (2013:325). 
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handed out. They require careful consideration and deliberation and should not be done 
haphazardly. In contrast, officials must also ensure that the sentence is appropriate and in 
line with the various theories of punishment, namely deterrence, rehabilitation, 
retribution and prevention.103 Therefore, a compensation order should not be imposed 
lightly as a means of punishment. However, if it is appropriate after considering all of the 
above factors, courts should not shy away from it. 
 
 
 
 
5.1 Reform or retribution? 
In the Thabethe case, the principles of the reform theory and the retribution theory were 
repeatedly contrasted.104 Although the complainant and her mother were in favour of the 
reform theory, the court nonetheless ruled that the perpetrator could not be reformed. It 
appears that the court only took into account that the law provides for a minimum 
sentence of imprisonment for a specific crime.105 Songca and Karels106 supported the 
court's view, but argue that restorative justice should be considered as a "parallel 
mechanism" that can support the retribution approach. It is therefore of great importance 
that the theories function together and complement each other. 
 
The accused was sentenced to direct imprisonment despite the fact that he apparently was 
not regarded as a future danger to the complainant, her family or society.107 He was also 
enrolled for a sexual offence prevention programme and was the breadwinner of his 
family.108 
 
It seems that the SCA in Seedat109 want to say that in all serious cases such as rape and 
murder there should always be direct imprisonment. However, the Supreme Courts in 
both Seedat110 and Thabete111 ruled that the accused should not only receive a prison 
sentence but should also have a sentence of restorative justice because of the unique 
circumstances and facts of the cases. In both cases the complainants were 
inconvenienced, while the appellants' greatest dissatisfaction with the sentences imposed 
was the fact that the courts did not consider the restorative sentence option as an 
alternative mechanism. The requests of both complainants were dismissed. 
 
It is suggested that compensation orders together with other restorative justice conditions 
could be imposed in certain circumstances. Just because an offender is convicted of rape, 
does not mean that he always deserves a harsh sentence such as imprisonment.112 This 
should especially be the case where the victims have requested and emphasised that their 
economic survival depends on the accused.113 
                                                 
103 Joubert (2013:327). 
104 DPP v Thabethe paras. 10, 12, 14–5, 19–20, 22. 
105 DPP v Thabethe para. 29. 
106 Songca & Karels (2016:466). 
107 DPP v Thabethe para. 11. 
108 DPP v Thabethe para. 2. 
109Seedat v S [2016] ZASCA 153 para. 38.  
110 Seedat v S [2015] 3 All SA 93 (GP) paras. 49–50. 
111 S v Thabethe paras. 40–1. 
112 See in general Watney (2015). 
113 S v Thabethe para. 20. 
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Compensation orders are generally not imposed because the courts are more focussed on 
retribution and the rights of the accused. In this context, it is argued that the Constitution 
is more in favour of accused persons than victims. Section 35 of the Constitution contains 
a number of stipulated rights which confirm and entrench the rights of an accused.114 
There are no separate clauses that specifically deal with the rights of victims. 
Nevertheless, it is conceded that the Constitutional Court in Carmichele v Minister of 
Safety and Security, in referring to the Bill of Rights in the Constitution, articulated the 
rights of victims and protected them.115 However, Carmichele was the exception to the 
rule. The victim had to institute a civil claim and did not receive any help from the 
criminal court, where she was the complainant. Maybe it is time for a paradigm shift in 
our courts to not only consider the accused's position, but also the position of the victim. 
Victims ought to receive protection from the criminal courts and should not have to 
institute civil proceedings at their own expense, as was the case in Carmichele. 
 
5.2 Interests of the community against the interests of the victim 
One of the factors to be considered in punishment is the interests of the community. 
However, it is mostly the case that the interests of the broader community take 
precedence over those of the individual victim. If compensation orders were more 
frequently imposed, it might encourage reluctant witnesses to come forward and testify in 
court so that criminals could be brought to book. Such orders would also satisfy more 
victims, because a mere term of imprisonment does not place bread on the table of the 
victims, while the imposition of a compensation order may well have this effect. The 
money goes to the victims or their families, and not into the state coffers. 
 
In both Thabethe116 and Seedat117 the SCA highlighted that the broader community will 
not be satisfied if only fines were imposed in rape cases. It indicated that the views of the 
public at large, as well as the absolute repulsiveness of the crimes, take precedence over 
the views of the victims. There will of course be those who will argue that you cannot 
impose a monetary payment on a person convicted of rape. The question will be: What 
message does it sent out to the broader community? 
 
In Seedat,118 the victim requested a cash payment and a motor vehicle; in Thabete119 the 
complainant and her mother asked that the accused should maintain them. The effect of 
the court’s judgments was that the victims again were on the receiving end. First, they 
were inconvenienced by the actions of the accused, and secondly, by the judgments of the 
court. The court sentenced both accused bearing in mind the interests of the community, 
while also wanting to send a message to future offenders in order to deter them. 
 
Maybe the time has come for our courts to become more complainant/victim-conscious 
instead of simply being accused-conscious. The focus must shift to determine what is also 
in the best interest of the complainants/victims. This will create more satisfied 
                                                 
114 S 35 of the Constitution, 1996. 
115 See Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security [2001] ZACC 22; 2001 4 SA 938 (CC). 
116 S v Thabethe para. 17. 
117 Seedat v S [2015] 3 All SA 93 (GP) para. 39. 
118 Seedat v S [2015] 3 All SA 93 (GP) paras. 31, 38. 
119 S v Thabethe para. 20. 
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complainants/victims who will walk out of our courts with an increased perception that 
the criminal justice system is not only for the benefit of the accused. It is not advocated 
that the vested rights of the accused should be diluted, but rather that the rights of 
complainants/victims should receive more prominence in criminal justice proceedings 
and especially during the imposition of sentence. During parole hearings the opinions of 
complainants/victims are already used to determine whether prisoners can be released on 
parole.120 There is a great opportunity to make more use of complainants and victims 
during sentencing. There is no reason why a compensation order together with direct 
imprisonment cannot be an appropriate sentence in some cases. 
 
Although the SCA in Seedat ruled that a compensation penalty is not appropriate, but that 
direct imprisonment must be imposed, the effect is that the judgment of the court is a 
combination of a compensation order and direct imprisonment. The accused had already 
paid R15 000 to the complainant.121 It was indicated in the appeal hearing that she could 
not repay this amount. One could argue that Seedat would not reclaim the amount, 
because it was considered in the imposition of his four-year period of imprisonment by 
the court. Thus, Seedat's sentence equates to: a period of four years direct imprisonment 
plus a compensation payment of R15 000.122 
 
However, no consideration were given to the people who were the most inconvenienced, 
who experienced the humiliation of being physically violated and who were deprived of 
their human dignity. A middle way, for example, to grant them compensation and to 
punish the offender, would have been more appropriate.123 A court must, after all, make a 
balanced judgment and take all factors into account. Only direct imprisonment in such 
cases is precisely an over-emphasis of the nature and the seriousness of the offence and 
ignores the interests of the victim. The focus is too reliant on what is an appropriate 
sentence for the offender. The Seedat case is distinguishable from the Hewitt case.124 The 
media and the public pressure played a greater role in the sentencing of Hewitt than of 
Seedat. Hewitt was also charged with more than one offence, while Seedat was only 
charged with one count of rape. In Seedat, the victim emphasised that she was satisfied 
with the imposition of a compensation payment, which was not the case in Hewitt.125 
 
It is conceded that compensation orders cannot and should not be considered in serious 
crimes such as rape and murder, and where it is not requested by the family of the victim 
or the deceased. But where it is asked for by the victim, there is no reason why it cannot 
be considered. In fact during parole hearings victims are asked for their views.126  During 
parole hearings the opinions of a group of people are taken into account, but the same 
does not take place in relation to sentencing. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The CPA 127 specifically provides for compensation orders. The application of these orders 
                                                 
120 S 75(4) of the Correctional Services Act 11 of 1998; s 299A of the CPA. 
121 Seedat v S para. 42. 
122 Seedat v S paras. 42–3. 
123 S v Zinn 1969 2 SA 537 (A). 
124 Seedat v S [2015] 3 All SA 93 (GP) para. 50; Hewitt v S para. 10. 
125 Seedat v S [2015] 3 All SA 93 (GP) para. 31; Hewitt v S paras. 11–3. 
126 S 75(4) of the Correctional Services Act  11 of 1998; s 299A of the CPA. 
127 Ss 297, 300 of the CPA. 
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has however, until now been, somewhat unsatisfactory. It is suggested that the 
stereotypical view regarding criminals - the general view that they are a danger to society - 
will have to change before we can speak of a greater role for restorative justice practices in 
the criminal context. 
 
Fattah128 puts it briefly as follows: "Another faulty premise underlying the use or penal 
sanctions is the mistaken belief that criminals are radically different from law-abiding 
citizens, a belief that leads to the creation of a false dichotomy between criminals and 
non-criminals”. 
 
To ensure that restorative justice gets its rightful place in any functional justice system, 
consideration must be given to all parties affected by the crime, including the offender 
and the victim. 
 
Compensation orders present several challenges. It is acknowledged that it will not always 
be financially possible for an accused to pay compensation.129 Also, the fact that a large 
percentage of offenders probably are living below the poverty line, does not mean that 
compensation orders should be ruled out immediately. Once an offender earns an income, 
he will be able to pay. The postponement of penalties is regularly allowed by the courts. 
 
In the judgments which were discussed in this contribution, the SCA held that 
compensation orders were not appropriate; yet a golden opportunity was missed to offer 
potential guidance to other courts as to when these orders should be considered. South 
African courts should in appropriate cases consider all possible options of restorative 
justice before heavier sentences are imposed. It is not an impossible task, but should be 
approached with caution. 
 
With South Africa being plagued by a high crime rate and associated overcrowded 
prisons, the time has come to rather focus more on alternative punishments such as 
compensation orders as opposed to the more conventional criminal remedies. Such 
orders could have a twofold benefit: fewer prisoners in overcrowded prisons and a 
definite positive contribution to the victims of crimes who will receive compensation for 
the harm or loss they suffered. This will result in an increased volume of satisfied victims 
in criminal cases, while people who are reluctant to give evidence in a court will be 
encouraged to come forward and play a role in building a safer society. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
128 Fattah (2007:214). 
129 See Buck (2005:149). 
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